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paper develops a formal model of auditor independence risk that may be used to begin a more 
rigorous investigation of auditor independence and various factors that are thought to affect 
this risk. 
The sensitivity of the model to various influences on independence risk is assessed by 
developing a base-level model and then modifying the assumptions for that model. Three 
research questions are investigated: what is the impact on independence risk of a lack of 
auditor 
integrity, the influence of professional standards, and the combined impact of opportunity and 
incentives. 
Overall, analytical results show that integrity is the key variable in minimizing independence 
risk. 
In addition, in cases where integrity could be questioned, independence risk is positively 
impacted by professional standards that are perceived to be effective and potentially negatively 
impacted by certain client characteristics and auditor incentives. 
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Abstract 
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comprehensive theory, framework or model of auditor independence risk does not exist. This 
paper develops a formal model  of auditor independence risk that may be used to begin a more 
rigorous investigation of auditor independence and various factors that are thought to affect this 
risk. 
The sensitivity of the model to various influences on independence risk is assessed by 
developing a base-level model and then modifying the assumptions for that model. Three 
research questions are investigated: what is the impact on independence risk of a lack of auditor 
integrity, the influence of professional standards, and the combined impact of opportunity and 
incentives. 
Overall, analytical results show that integrity is the key variable in minimizing independence risk. 
In addition, in cases where integrity could be questioned, independence risk is positively 
impacted by professional standards that are perceived to be effective and potentially negatively 
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A Formal Model of Auditor Independence Risk 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2000, the Independence Standards Board (ISB) released an exposure draft titled 
“Statement of Independence Concepts - A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence” (ISB 
2000).1 The exposure draft identifies four components of an independence framework: threats to 
auditor independence, safeguards to auditor independence, independence risk, and significance of 
threats and effectiveness of safeguards. In February 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) released a more detailed document, Final Rule: Revision of the Commission's Auditor 
Independence Requirements (SEC 2001). The final rules draw on the conceptual framework 
developed by the ISB and address specific situations in which an auditor is not independent of an audit 
client. Those situations include certain financial, employment, and business relationships and also 
transactions or situations involving the provision of non-audit services or involving the receipt of 
contingent fees.  
In November 2001, a framework similar to that of the ISB exposure draft was included in the IFAC 
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (IFAC 2001). In the academic arena, Johnstone et al. 
(2001) developed a framework identifying factors that may increase auditor independence risk and 
factors that may mitigate that risk. Each of these frameworks and set of rules is general in nature and 
                                                 
1  The ISB was dissolved on July 31, 2001 without releasing a final version of its independence 
framework.  Staff members released a report that was to have been presented to the full ISB, but a 
final form of the framework was never approved. 
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only suggests loose connections between various factors. None of the frameworks or set of rules 
attempt to formally relate these connections. 
Independence risk (IR) is the risk that threats to auditor independence, to the extent that they are not 
mitigated by safeguards, compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s 
ability to make unbiased audit decisions (ISB 2000). In this paper, we develop a formal model of 
independence risk and use it to show how questions such as those involving complex interrelationships 
among model variables can be addressed. We recognize the various factors identified in the preliminary 
ISB framework, in the similar framework developed by the Ethics Committee of the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC 2001), and in the Johnstone et al. (2001) framework. While each 
framework notes that independence may be impaired without auditor intent, we focus on intentional 
impairment resulting from knowledgeable actions taken by the auditor. 
Specifically, we demonstrate the usefulness of the model by examining three different research questions: 
1. What is the impact of a lack of auditor integrity on auditor independence risk? 
2. What is the impact of professional standards on auditor independence risk? 
3. For an assumed level of lack of auditor integrity, what is the impact of opportunity and 
incentives on auditor independence risk? 
A FORMAL MODEL OF INDEPENDENCE RISK 
Independence risk can be viewed as a function of three factors: incentive, opportunity, and auditor 
integrity and can be represented as: 
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    IR = f (IN, OP, AI) 
where IR represents Independence Risk, IN represents a continuum of the various types of incentives 
that may entice auditors to violate ethics guidelines, OP represents a continuum of the opportunities 
available to the auditor to bias professional judgments, and AI represents a continuum measuring the 
lack of auditor’s ethical moral integrity. For IR to exist, each component is necessary, but not sufficient. 
That is, independence will be impaired only when the auditor lacks integrity and when there is both 
opportunity and incentive. 
For an auditor to knowingly allow his or her decisions to become biased, some form of incentive must 
exist. Otherwise, the auditor would be risking sanctions ranging from censure to expulsion from the 
profession with no compensating benefit. The various codes of ethics (e.g. IFAC 2001) and regulatory 
rules (e.g. SEC 2001) identify numerous incentives such as financial and employment relationships and 
non-audit services that may impact independence. Johnstone et al. (2001) categorize these as direct 
incentives and indirect incentives. Examples of direct incentives include financial investment in the client, 
consulting fees, contingent fees, promises of future employment, and material financial dependence. 
Indirect incentives include situations such as when the auditor has strong interpersonal relationships with 
client personnel, or when family members have a relationship with the client through financial investments 
or employment. A substantial portion of each professional code of ethics focuses on controlling direct 
and indirect incentives, but controls also exist in audit firm and regulatory agency guidelines. 
A second factor necessary for IR to exist is an opportunity for bias by the auditor to have a significant 
impact on the auditor’s report. Opportunity may exist in the presence of complex financial transactions 
Srivastava, Rajendra. (2002) A Formal Framework of Auditor Independence Risk. Australian Accounting Review, 12, 31-38. 
Publisher's Official Version: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291835-2561>. 
Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
 
 4 
 
or when management must make significant estimates or assumptions. Opportunity for auditor bias also 
may exist when difficult interpretations of generally accepted accounting principles must be made and 
applied or in determining an appropriate level of reporting materiality. Opportunities for bias generally 
are controlled by generally accepted auditing standards, by audit firm policies, by regulatory agencies, 
and through effective corporate governance. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 (SEC 1999), for example, focuses on materiality and suggests that auditors 
may impair independence by allowing clients to influence materiality decisions. 
Auditor integrity, and the opposite condition, lack of integrity, relates to the propensity of an individual 
auditor to engage in inappropriate activities. An auditor with high ethical standards may remain 
completely independent in thought and action despite the existence of strong incentives and available 
opportunities. Other auditors, however, may find incentives at some point to be too enticing to resist 
and, given opportunities, may allow financial statement to be published without issuing an appropriate 
opinion. Auditor integrity is controlled to the extent possible by audit firm culture (Ponemon 1992), 
procedures and training, and by restrictions on entry into the profession. 
To deal with the calculus through which we combine information to assess independence risk, there are 
several frameworks and formal languages that might be used. Included are those based on probability 
theory, fuzzy logic, possibility theory (Zadeh 1978, 1979) or belief functions (Shafer 1976, Smets 
1990a, 1990b, 1998). These frameworks have different tradeoffs and seem to be more applicable in 
certain problem domains than in other domains.  
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Srivastava and Shafer (1992) argue that belief functions provide a more flexible and adaptable way to 
combine evidence (see also, Akresh et al. 1988). One aspect of this flexibility is that the belief function 
framework reduces to the Bayesian framework in some situations. Belief functions also provide a 
coherent way of mapping uncertainty judgments in auditing (Harrison 1999, Harrison et al. 2002), and 
incorporating ambiguity within decision-making (Srivastava 1997, Srivastava and Mock 2000).  
In the evidential network approach under belief functions, items of evidence are combined using 
Dempster's rule of combination. We have used the computer program "Auditor's Assistant" (Shafer et 
al.1988) to draw the evidential network and to perform our analyses using the belief-function 
framework.  
Figure 1 represents our basic model of auditor independence risk and is intended to represent an 
analysis viewed from the standpoint of an external observer, such as an investor. The model has two 
types of nodes—variables and independence factors.   
The focus of the model is the variable node ‘Maintain Independence’ that represents the level of 
confidence that the auditor maintains independence throughout the audit. The Maintain Independence 
variable has two components—the first representing belief that independence is maintained and the 
second representing belief that independence in not maintained. These two values do not necessarily 
add to one because of residual uncertainty resulting from a lack of knowledge on the part of the 
observer.2 One minus the level of belief that independence is maintained is Independence Risk. 
 
                                                 
2 For a review of belief functions and an explanation of residual uncertainty, see Srivastava and Mock 
(2002). 
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The independence factors are those factors that are thought to influence IR as identified in the 
professional literature. The numerical values shown in the independence factor nodes (the rectangles) in 
the model represent assessments made by the external observer and serve as input into the model 
variables, represented by rectangles with rounded corners. The assessments in the rectangles are 
determined by an observer assessing IR and each assessment has two values, shown in parentheses, for 
each linked variable related to the particular independence factor. The first value shown represents as 
assessment of the strength of evidence supporting the variable (for) and the second value represents the 
strength of evidence negating the variable (against).  
For example, the Auditor’s Ethical and Moral Characteristics assessment in Figure 1 is related to the 
Integrity variable. The first number in the set of parentheses indicates the observer’s belief that the 
auditor has integrity, in this case assumed to be 0.90 on a scale of zero to one. A zero value would 
indicate the assessor has no evidence while a value of one represents certainty. More specifically, a zero 
level of support in favor of Integrity means that there is no evidence that the auditor has integrity and a 
value of one means that the assessor is certain that the auditor has complete integrity. In Figure 1, the 
second number in this set of parentheses, zero, indicates that in the judgment of the observer there is no 
evidence indicating a lack of integrity 
The variable Maintain Independence is related with three other variables: ‘Integrity’, ‘No Incentive’, and 
‘No Opportunity’ through an ‘OR’ relationship. This relationship is represented by the hexagonal box 
containing ‘OR’ in Figure 1. The ‘OR’ implies that independence risk will be minimal in any one of the 
following conditions: the auditor has high integrity, or the auditor has no incentive to benefit, or there is 
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no opportunity to benefit. Conversely, there will be a lack of independence only when there is a lack of 
integrity and there is incentive and opportunity. 
-----  Figure 1 here  ----- 
These three variables represented in Figure 1 by rectangular boxes with rounded corners are connected 
to rectangular boxes representing independence factors pertaining to the variables as described above. 
For example, ‘Firm Policy’ represents a factor that pertains to the variables ‘Integrity’, ‘No Incentive’, 
and ‘No Opportunity’. Audit firm policies encourage high integrity, help mitigate auditors’ incentives, 
and limit opportunities to benefit inappropriately from the audit. 
 Similarly, ‘Professional Policies’, ‘External Regulatory Agencies’ and ‘Corporate Governance’ are 
three other factors that pertain to the same three variables. These factors also encourage auditor’s 
integrity and mitigate auditors’ incentive and opportunity to benefit from the audit. The factor ‘Auditor 
Characteristics’ in the model only pertains directly to the variable ‘Integrity’. The factor ‘Direct and 
Indirect’ indicate direct and indirect incentives as discussed above.  
When assessing independence risk, it is important to obtain information on audit firm policies in these 
areas and to assess the effects of various other influences on IR. This model can assist in the assessment 
process as is demonstrated in the following analysis and results section. Figure 1, of course, is only one 
way to specify how the factors that influence independence risk may be interrelated. 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The sensitivity of the model to various influences on IR is assessed by developing a base-level model 
and then modifying the assumptions for that model to examine three research questions. The first 
question examines the impact of a lack of auditor integrity on IR. The second research question 
investigates the influence of professional standards, such as codes of ethics, on IR. The third research 
question investigates for an assumed level of belief regarding lack of integrity, the impact of opportunity 
and incentives on IR. 
Base-Level Model 
To analyze the model shown in Figure 1, the observer first assigns values related to each factor in the 
rectangular boxes pertaining to each linked variable and then calculates the influence of such values on 
IR. In other words, given the information available, the observer needs to assess the level of support in 
favor of the variable or its negation. The assumed values for the various variables in the base-level 
model are detailed in Table 1.  
-----  Table 1 here  ----- 
While belief values are subjective, those in Table 1 are selected to represent realistic circumstances in 
actual audits. In our base-level model, assuming the assessor has supportive information on the 
Auditor’s Ethical and Moral Characteristics, we assign belief values of 0.90 supporting (for) auditor 
integrity and zero belief value negating (against) auditor integrity. These levels indicate that the auditor 
being assessed appears to the observer to have high ethical and moral standards and that there is no 
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evidence indicating otherwise. Such assumptions appear to be reasonable based on the numerous 
screening procedures employed by the profession and by individual auditing firms. 
As noted previously, for Independence Risk to exist, there must be some form of opportunity allowing 
the auditor to make biased audit decisions. Part of the opportunity exists with the audit client itself, 
where a volatile business environment, transactions for which GAAP is not well defined, and the 
complexity of transactions each offer the opportunity for bias. Opportunity also is present when 
management must make difficult estimates and assumptions or when judgments required of the auditor 
relate to client or auditee characteristics, such as establishing reporting materiality levels. In Table 1 we 
assume a constant against belief value of 0.70 from Auditee Characteristics. Since the variable being 
assessed is ‘No Opportunity’, a 0.70 against belief value indicates that the audit situation offers a 
number of opportunities for the auditor to develop biased judgments.  
Firm Policies are assigned a for belief value of 0.40 for the base-level model. This moderate value is 
assumed because under professional guidelines, each individual audit firm has the responsibility of 
ensuring independence on each audit engagement. This is noted specifically in the IFAC Code of Ethics 
for Professional Accountants (IFAC 2001) “…firms and members of assurance teams have an 
obligation to identify and evaluate circumstances and relationships that create threats to independence 
and to take appropriate action to eliminate these threats or to reduce them to an acceptable level by the 
application of safeguards.” Firm policies impact Auditor Integrity through hiring policies, internal codes 
of ethics, and training. Incentives are impacted through restrictions and monitoring of financial and 
familial relationships and similar activities. Opportunities are controlled through client screening, 
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supervision, review policies, and audit firm guidance in regards to such factors as audit program design 
and materiality choice. 
Professional Standards, which include codes of ethics by certifying boards and by professional 
organizations, peer review activities, and required continuing education, impact all three components of 
IR. For the influence of Professional Standards, in the base-level model we assume a constant for belief 
value of 0.20 for the influence on Integrity, indicating influence primarily through restrictions regarding 
certifications, by establishing codes of ethics, and by having the ability to sanction auditors who violate 
standards. A for belief value of 0.40 is assumed for the influence on No Incentive, reflecting specific 
guidance regarding inappropriate direct and indirect incentives. A for belief value of 0.30 for the 
influence on No Opportunity is assumed, reflecting a moderate level of influence on audits through 
activities such as establishing generally accepted auditing standards and providing guidance on issues 
such as materiality choice. 
External Regulatory Agencies provide general guidance about planning and executing an audit, review 
completed audits and investigate audit failures. The influence of External Regulatory Agencies is 
recognized at belief values similar to those for Professional Policies. For the base model we assume for 
belief values of 0.20 for influence on Integrity, 0.40 for influence on No Incentives, and 0.30 for 
influence on No Opportunity.  
 
Corporate Governance provides the structure through which the objectives of a company are set, and 
the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance (OECD 1999). Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that 
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are in the interests of the company and shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. Ramsay 
(2001) included a number of recommendations related to improving corporate governance, including (1) 
mandating the existence of qualified audit committees on boards of directors, (2) specifying the 
composition of audit committees, and (3) specifying the duties and of zero is responsibilities of the audit 
committee. Some, but not all, recommendations made by Ramsay were adopted in the IFAC Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants released in November 2001 (Hayes 2002; IFAC 2001). For the 
base-level model we assume a for belief value of 0.40 as input for each of the Integrity, No Incentive, 
and No Opportunity variables. It also is assumed that there is no evidence against the variables 
influenced by Corporate Governance and thus a value assigned. 
Direct and Indirect Incentives are assigned an against belief value of 0.90. This value assumes that the 
influence of direct and indirect incentives, which might include various forms of personal gain, can be 
quite substantial. 
Given these belief values, a determination of the overall belief that the audit does Maintain Independence 
can be calculated. As noted earlier, we use a Belief Function calculus to estimate these values. 
Assuming the base-level values of Table 1, it can be seen in Figure 1 that the Integrity variable has a 
value of 0.915 for and a value of zero against. The increase of 0.015 from the value of 0.90 obtained 
from Auditor’s Ethical and Moral Characteristics results from additional comfort derived from other 
inputs, such as Firm Policy. 
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The No Incentive variable has a for value of 0.185 and an against value of 0.734. This indicates that 
the high against belief value of 0.90 for Direct and Indirect Incentives not only has been reduced by 
factors such as Firm Policy, but that the mitigating variables now provide a 0.185 for belief value. 
Similarly, the No Opportunity variable has a for value of 0.155 and an against value of 0.591. The 
variable also has been influenced by the mitigating factors of Firm Policies, Professional Standards, 
External Regulatory Agencies, and Corporate Governance. 
Finally, the Maintain Independence variable combines the Integrity, No Incentive, and No Opportunity 
variable to a for value of 0.918, indicating a relatively high belief that auditor independence is 
maintained. The zero against value indicates that there is no unmitigated evidence that independence is 
impaired. One minus the for value results in Independence Risk of 0.082. As there is no unmitigated 
against evidence that independence is impaired, IR consists solely of the residual uncertainty resulting 
from lack of evidence.  
Given these results for the base-level model, we now can examine the sensitivity of the model to 
changes in different factors affecting Integrity, No Incentive, and No Opportunity. We begin this with 
Research Question 1. 
Research Question 1: What is the impact of lack of integrity on auditor independence risk? 
Hiring and certification processes, codes of ethics, and peer influences all serve to increase the 
likelihood that auditors exhibit high moral and ethical characteristics. Audit firms tend to hire top 
graduates, usually after consultation with faculty members and others regarding the graduates’ academic 
abilities and character. The certification process serves as an additional filter by excluding individuals 
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with criminal records and by requiring knowledge of the code of ethics. Even after certification, 
individuals can be expelled from the profession by being convicted of crimes or because of other 
transgressions.  
To examine the influence of the moral and ethical propensities of the auditor on IR, as shown in Figure 
2, we examine the Auditor Ethical and Moral Characteristics for belief variable at three distinct levels: 
zero, indicating no knowledge about integrity, 0.45 indicating a moderate level of integrity, and 0.90 
indicating a high level of integrity.  With the for belief value at zero, we increment the against belief 
value in steps of 0.10 from a value of zero to a value of 1.00. With the for belief value at 0.45, the 
against belief value is incremented in steps of 0.10 from zero to 0.50 and with the for belief value at 
0.90, the against belief value is examined at zero and 0.1. Other for and against belief values in Table 
1, columns 5 and 6, are the same values as in the base-level model. 
-----  Figure 2 here  ----- 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, as the for belief value from Auditor’s Ethical and Moral Characteristics 
increases from zero to 0.90, IR decreases from about 0.18 to 0.04. However, for a given level of a for 
belief value, as the against belief value, i.e. lack of integrity, increases, the IR increases, but at a much 
smaller rate. This finding indicates that unless the observer has a relatively high confidence in the auditor, 
IR likely will be at a very high and likely unacceptable level. 
Research Question 2: What is the impact of professional standards on auditor independence risk? 
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One mitigating factor depended on by users of financial statements is participation by various regulatory 
agencies in setting standards related to independence. Such agencies may be involved in the setting of 
standards related to audits, in the enforcement of those standards, or both (e.g. Pincus et al. 1987).  
To examine the influence of regulatory agencies on IR, we vary the for belief values as follows (See 
Figure 3 and Table 1, columns 7 and 8). For the influence of Professional Standards on Integrity, we 
vary the for belief values from 0.10 to 0.60; for No Incentive, we vary the for belief value Professional 
Standards from 0.30 to 1.00; and for No Opportunity, the for belief values are varied from 0.20 to 
0.90. For each combination, Independence Risk is calculated for two for belief values of Auditor 
Ethical and Moral Characteristics—0.80 and 0.90. 
-----  Figure 3 here  ----- 
It can be seen from Figure 3 that Professional Standards do have an observable effect on IR in that IR 
decreases substantially as the influence of professional standards is assessed to be stronger. In addition, 
when compared to Figure 2, it can be seen that even when Auditor Ethical and Moral Characteristics 
are assumed to be 0.90, Professional Standards still are able to reduce IR to much lower levels. 
Research Question 3:  For an assumed level of lack of integrity, what is the impact of opportunity and 
incentive on auditor independence risk? 
It is of interest to examine how different levels of incentives and how different levels of opportunity affect 
IR. To accomplish this, we increment beliefs from two variables. First, the belief from Direct and 
Indirect Incentives is varied as this belief value impacts only the No Incentives variable (See Table 1, 
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columns 9 and 10). Second, the belief from Auditee Characteristics is varied as this belief value impacts 
only the No Opportunity variable.  
-----  Figure 4 here  ----- 
As can be seen in Figure 4, as the belief for Incentives from Direct and Indirect Incentives is 
incremented in steps of 0.10 from zero to 1.00, IR essentially doubles from 0.11 to 0.20. This indicates 
that control of incentives is an important part of maintaining auditor independence. It also is seen that as 
the  against belief for No Opportunities from Auditee Characteristics is incremented from zero to 1.00, 
IR increases from 0.13 to 0.19.  
SUMMARY 
The main purpose of this paper is to develop and then evaluate a formal model of auditor independence 
risk. This model has been developed as an initial step in understanding the importance of various factors 
identified in the literature which are thought to affect independence. The model is used to address three 
research questions involving assessing the impact of four factors on Independence Risk:  
1. auditor integrity,  
2. professional standards 
3. direct and indirect incentives and 
4. auditee characteristics.   
Initial analyses show that independence risk is sensitive to each of these factors although the magnitude 
of the effects varies substantially across the cases examined.  More specifically, the main results show 
that integrity is the key variable in minimizing independence risk. In addition, in cases where integrity 
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could be questioned, independence risk is reduced when there are professional standards that are 
perceived to be effective and can be increased by certain client characteristics and auditor incentives. 
Given that this paper is a first attempt at developing a formal model of independence risk, the model 
presented is quite simplified. In fact, the modeling results could be interpreted as merely establishing the 
face validity of the model as well as supporting common beliefs about the importance of controlling 
incentives and opportunities. Thus, future analytical research is needed to develop more complex 
models. Such models may include additional influences, such as environmental complexity, that may 
affect independence risk and also can involve more complex interrelationships among variables. For 
example, a model may introduce a relationship between incentive and integrity where incentive 
influences integrity, i.e. a very strong incentive may influence the auditor to compromise his or her 
integrity. Similarly, a great opportunity may entice the auditor to compromise his or her integrity.  
Empirical research also is needed to examine the effects of various influences and to validate analytical 
findings in a field setting. Once the model has been empirically validated and appropriate metrics have 
been established, the model can be useful in measuring the relationship between auditor integrity and 
independence risk. Similarly, an empirically grounded model can examine the influence of professional 
standards on reducing incentives and the corresponding impact on independence risk. Such studies not 
only can validate the analytical findings shown in this paper, but also can improve audit practice by 
allowing incorporation of the features of the model into actual audits to help control independence risk. 
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Table 1 
Assumed Variable Values 
 
  Strength of Belief About Evidence 
  Baseline Case 
(Figure 1) Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Research Question 3 
Variable Linked Variable For1 Against2 For Against For Against For Against 
Auditor 
Characteristics Integrity 0.90 0.00 0.00-1.00 1.00-0.00 .90 0.00 0.80 0.20 
Auditee 
Characteristics No Opportunity 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.70 0.00 
0.70 
0.00-1.00 
Firm Policies Integrity 
No Incentive 
No Opportunity 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Professional 
Standards 
Integrity 
No Incentive 
No Opportunity 
0.20 
0.40 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10-0.60 
0.30-1.00 
0.15-0.90 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
External Regulatory 
Agencies 
Integrity 
No Incentive 
No Opportunity 
0.20 
0.40 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Corporate 
Governance 
Integrity 
No Incentive 
No Opportunity 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Direct and Indirect 
Incentives No Incentive 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.90 0.00 
0.00-1.00 
0.90 
 1 For values support the Linked Variable 
 2 Against values negate the Linked Variable 
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Figure 1 
Model* of Auditor Independence Risk with Base-Level Belief Values 
Integrity 
.915; .0
No Incentive 
.185; .734
No Opportunity 
.155; .591
Maintain Independence 
.918; .0
  OR  
Auditor's Ethical and Moral Characteristics 
(0.9, 0)
Firm Policies 
(0.4, 0)
Professional Standards 
(0.2, 0); (0.4, 0); (0.3, 0)
External Regulatory Agencies Auditee Characteristics 
(0, 0.7)
Direct or Indirect 
(0, 0.9)
Corporate Governance 
(0.4, 0)
(0.2, 0); (0.4, 0); (0.3, 0)
 
* In the above independence risk model, a rectangular box with rounded corners represents a variable node and a rectangular box represents an 
independence factor node pertaining to the variable(s) to which it is linked. The first number in the variable node represents the level of belief 
(“belief value”) that the variable is true and the second number represents the level of belief that the variable is not true. The independence factor 
nodes—Professional Policies, and External Regulatory Agencies—contain three sets of numbers each. In each case, these sets of numbers from 
left to right, respectively, pertain to the variables ‘Integrity’, ‘No Incentive’, and ‘No Opportunity’. The first number in parentheses represents the 
belief that the corresponding variable is true and the second number represents the belief that the corresponding variable is not true.
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Figure 2 
The Impact of Auditor Integrity on Independence Risk 
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Figure 3 
The Effect of Professional Standards on Independence Risk* 
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* While the belief from Professional Standards for No Incentive plotted along the x-axis 
varies from 0.2 to 1.0, the belief from Professional Standards for Integrity and No 
Opportunity increments from 0.10 to 0.50 and from 0.15 to 0.75, respectively. 
Srivastava, Rajendra. (2002) A Formal Framework of Auditor Independence Risk. Australian Accounting Review, 12, 31-38. 
Publisher's Official Version: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291835-2561>. 
Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
 
 24 
 
Figure 4 
The Impact of Auditee Characteristics and  
Direct/Indirect Incentives on Independence Risk 
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